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REVALUATION OF ASSETS AS A SOURCE OF CASH DIVIDENDS:
A Conflict Between Law and Accounting
Corporation statutes and accounting principles have tradi-
tionally dictated that cash dividends to stockholders are
available only out of retained earnings and capital in excess of
par or stated value. It appears that under Maryland law an
additional source is available, in the form of a capital surplus
created by a revaluation of fixed assets. The author suggests
that this may be done by an actual write up of asset value on
the company books from cost to fair value, or by an informal
appraisal, despite objections from the accounting profession.
The author also discusses the tax treatment of revaluation and
the notice requirements of the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
INTRODUCTION
One of the principal rules of corporation law is that dividends must
be paid out of surplus and not out of capital. Historically, the rationale
for maintaining capital intact was that capital represented a "trust
fund" for the payment of corporate debts.' Accordingly, the rule was
developed to insure the protection of creditors by restricting the
actions of the corporation. In part, because of limitations imposed on
distributions to stockholders out of assets representing the capital, the
corporation was accorded the privilege of limited liability.2
The rule has been codified in state corporation laws by variously
worded provisions imposing restrictions upon payment of dividends.
Interpretation of these provisions has raised significant questions about
the legal definitions of surplus and capital,3 primarily because the
1. Wood v. Drummer, 30 F. Cas. 435, 436-37 (No. 17944) (C.C.D. Me. 1824).
2. Hackney, Accounting Principles in Corporation Law, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 791,
798-99 (1965).
3. As used in this text, the following definitions apply:
a) capital, capital stock: the amount on the corporation books corresponding to
par value of issued shares, and in the case of no-par stock, an amount equal to its
stated value. Also known as stated capital and legal capital.
b) profit: net income realized from earnings of the current accounting period.
c) surplus: includes both capital surplus and earned surplus.
1) capital surplus: an amount contributed in excess of par or stated value of
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lawyer and the accountant employ different, and often conflicting,
definitions of accounting terminology in corporate statutory language. 4
The conflict can be explained partially by the different objectives
sought by corporation statutes and by accounting. The historical
purpose of the dividend rule in corporation statutes has been the
preservation of the trust fund for the protection of creditors, while the
purpose of accounting is to prepare financial statements.'
It is arguable that the emphasis on creditor protection by statute is
misplaced, in view of current business realities. In the United States
today, raising capital may be as much an incentive for incorporating as
a public business as obtaining limited liability. Creditor protection can
be insured by operations of the business world, while corporation
statutes should be directed toward investor protection.6 Recent
statutory changes in a few states reflect this evolution and appear to
conform to modem accounting standards more than do the older
statutes."
An acute problem exists, however, even with many of the new
statutes. Corporation laws traditionally have been concerned primarily
with the worth of a company as reflected in its balance sheet. In recent
years the accounting and business emphasis has shifted from a concern
of balance sheet worth to the earning capacity as reflected in the
income statement.' There are indications that the accounting trend of
the future is to emphasize cash flow as depicted by the statement of
source and application of funds.9 It would appear (not surprisingly
issued shares; an amount credited to the equity account from a source other
than earnings. Also known as paid-in surplus and capital in excess of par, it
includes donated surplus and surplus created by a capital reduction.
2) earned surplus: accumulated earnings and profits realized from past ac-
counting periods less dividends previously paid. Also known as retained
earnings.
Note: These definitions attempt to express both accounting and legal meanings and do
not necessarily conform to recommendations of the AICPA.
4. "The terms capital and surplus have established meanings in other fields, such as eco-
nomics and law, which are not in accordance with the concepts the accountant seeks to
express in using those terms." American Institute of Certified Public Accountants,
ACCOUNTING TERMINOLOGY BULL. No. 1, 29 (1953).
5. The accounting profession.., is concerned primarily with a nonlegal goal: the
preparation of financial statements that 'fairly present' the financial condition
and results of operations of an enterprise, not for any single purpose required by
law, but for the general purpose of informing investors, creditors, consumers,
employees, and other interested parties.
Hackney, supra note 2, at 791.
6. Today... both sophisticated and uninformed creditors alike have available
such a wealth of credit information and remedies that the primary thrust of regu-
latory financial measures is toward the security of shareholders against possible
depredations of management and protection of minority shareholders from the
schemes of an unprincipled majority.
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. (SECOND) § 2, 2, comment (1971).
7. Kreidmann, Dividends-Changing Patterns, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 372 (1957).
8. Hackney, supra note 2, at 813.
9. T. FIFLIS & H. KRIPKE, ACCOUNTING FOR BUsINESS LAWYERS 60 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as FIFLIS & KRIPKE]. The book contains an excellent presentation of the problem con-
sidered in this text. See Chaps. 7 and 9 particularly.
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since the accounting profession is relatively young) that accounting
concepts are changing at a faster rate than the law of corporations.
The conflict between law and accounting reaches its peak with the
subject of asset valuation. The corporation statute emphasis on balance
sheet worth necessarily involves consideration of value. The account-
ant's concern with earnings, however, requires more consideration of
the treatment of income than of asset valuation. Accounting principles
dictate that assets, specifically fixed assets, will be carried on the books
at cost of acquisition and that any increase in their value will not be
recognized until realized by sale upon disposition of the assets.' 0 This
cardinal rule of accounting, known as the realization concept, is the key
to determining what funds are availabile for distribution to stock-
holders. It is the accounting counterpart of the trust fund rule in the
law of dividends.
What happens when a company which has fully depreciated the
useful life of its fixed assets desires to revalue those assets to reflect
appreciation in market value? Or suppose its books carry a cost for land
acquired years ago that reflects only a fraction of its worth in today's
real estate market. Can the company revalue these assets, either by an
appraisal not shown on its books or by an actual write-up that is shown,
thereby creating a surplus and subsequently pay a cash dividend from
that surplus?'
I. REVALUATION OF ASSETS AS A SOURCE OF
CASH DIVIDEND
Although a minority within the accounting profession argues that
such a practice should be allowed 2, the overwhelming opinion of the
accountants is that the practice of recognizing unrealized appreciation
of fixed assets' I for cash dividend purposes is contrary to the
10. Since accounting is predominately based on cost, the proper uses of the word
value in accounting are largely restricted to the statement of items at cost, or at
modifications of cost. In accounting, the term market value [or fair value] is used
in senses differing somewhat from those attaching to the expression in law....
In the case of so-called fixed assets the value shown in accounts is the balance of
their cost (actual or modified) after deducting recorded depreciation.
ATB No. 1, supra note 4, at 17.
11. Whether such surplus is earned surplus or capital surplus is one of the questions to be
resolved in this text.
It should be noted that these questions are based on the premise of a "going concern"
and the company anticipates neither liquidation nor sale of its assets in the near future.
12. American Accounting Association, The Realization Concept, 40 AcCTG. REV. 312 (1965);
American Accounting Association, The Matching Concept, 40 AccTG. REV. 368 (1965);
FiLis & KREPKE at 308.
13. "Unrealized appreciation of physical assets is the estimated excess of the market
value over the cost of the property." Statutes, Case Law, and Generally Accepted Ac-
counting Principles on the Write-Up of Physical Assets, 28 U. CIN. L. REV. 79 (1959).
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realization concept and to sound accounting principles.'" Although
there exists no complete accounting code, the accountant is bound by
generally accepted accounting principles (G.A.A.P.)' which are
determined by custom and usage within the profession and by periodic
statements of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA).1 6 Additional guidelines are provided by rules and regulations
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, but they tend to follow
established standards of accounting.
Cash dividends from unrealized appreciation of fixed assets are
generally presumed to be prohibited by the traditional trust fund
rule' I and are specifically prohibited by statutory language in several
14. "[P Iroperty, plant, and equipment should not be written up by an entity to reflect ap-
praisal, market or current values which are above cost to the entity." AICPA, Account-
ing Principles Board, APB NO. 6, Oct. 1965.
The AICPA previously attempted to recognize the practice of revaluation in ARB 43,
Chap. 9B (1953) by authorizing the creation of a separate account within capital sur-
plus, called unrealized appreciation on fixed assets, and recommended that deprecia-
tion be computed on the written-up figures by charging excess depreciation thus
created directly to this account. APB NO. 6 retracted that position, however, and
attempted to return the accounting profession to its view prior to 1953.
15. In addition to the realization convention, some of the prominent accounting principles
or conventions are:
a) conservatism: Recognize losses more readily than gains.
b) cost convention: List all assets at cost minus depreciation, regardless of current
value.
c) constant dollar value assumption: Ignore fluctuations in the value of the dollar.
d) going concern premise: There will be future income periods to absorb Deferred
Expenses.
See FIFLIS & KRIPKE at 82-85.
16. The AICPA issues statements of accounting principles from time to time in the form of
opinions of its Accounting Research Board (ARB) and Accounting Principles Board
(APB). Primarily because of judicial reluctance to accord legal weight to unwritten
G.A.A.P. in accountant liability cases, the AICPA is currently in the process of com-
piling or codifying all G.A.A.P.
17. A review of English law indicates that the rule in Great Britain may not be as restrictive
as is commonly presumed. The issue was raised in at least two cases which were de-
cided on other grounds. In re Spanish Prospecting Co., 1 Cb. 92 (C.A. 1911) and In re
Oxford Benefit Bldg. & Inv. Soc'y, 35 Ch. D. 502 (1886). "The question whether accre-
tions to capital can be distributed when they are unrealized but proved to exist has not
been decided." 6 HALSBURY's LAWS OF ENG. 400 (3d. ed. 1954). However, one important
case has held that unrealized appreciation may be used to wipe out a deficit, leaving
earnings in subsequent years available for dividends. Ammonia Soda Co. v. Chamber-
lain, 1 Ch. 266 (1918).
No help was provided by recent statutes. "No dividend shall be paid otherwise than
out of profits." Companies Act of 1948, 11 & 12 GEO. 6, c. 38, sched. I, Table A, art. 116;
cf. "[T]he directors may... fix the value for distribution of such specific assets...
and may determine that cash payments shall be made to any members upon the footing
of the value so fixed." Id. § 120. "There is nothing in the Act determining how profits
available for distribution as dividends are to be reckoned." 6 HALSBURY's LAWS OF ENG.
399 (3d. ed.).
In Australia, however, revaluation of fixed assets, for dividend purposes and other-
wise, seems to be common practice.
Over 20 per cent of companies now listed on the Australian stock exchanges have
made bonus issues [in the period 1948-1957 ], a significant proportion of them
from revaluation of assets. Quite a number of other companies have written up
assets without making bonus issues.
R. CHAMBERS, ACCOUNTING FINANCE AND MANAGEMENT 171 (1969).
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states.' 8 For the majority of states, however, it is a matter of judicial
interpretation of dividend statutes as to whether the practice will be
allowed. The essential question, therefore, is not whether sound
accounting or management principles are violated, but whether such an
action by corporate directors is permitted by law.' 9
II. DEVELOPMENT OF NEW YORK LAW AND CASE
LAW GENERALLY
The conflict was brought into sharp focus in June, 1942, when the
Court of Appeals of New York affirmed a 1940 decision of the
Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court. The case was
Randall v. Bailey2", and it remains the leading American case on the
subject. The holding of the case interpreted the New York corporation
statute, as it existed then, 2' I as permitting revaluation of fixed assets
for purposes of a cash distribution from the capital surplus created by
the unrealized appreciation in value. The Randall decision has been
codified in the present New York dividend statute.2 2
New York case law on revaluation of assets developed rather
haphazardly until Randall clarified the subject. Jennery v. Olmstead2 ,
although not a dividend case, held that the increase in value of bonds
not being sold was not a profit and therefore anticipated market value
18. California: CAL. CORP. CODE § 1502 (1955); Idaho: IDAHO CODE § 30-130.5(b) (1967); Illi-
nois: ILL. REV. STAT., c. 32, § 157.41(c) (1954); Indiana: IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-211 (1970);
Iowa: IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A.41(3) (1962); Ohio: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.33(A)
(1953). All prohibit cash dividends from unrealized appreciation, but permit stock divi-
dends, except for California which prohibits both. Louisiana previously prohibited the
practice, but recently revised its statutes to expressly permit revaluation. LA. REV.
STAT. §§ 12.1(E), 12.63 (1969).
19. Even where state law permits such a practice, the act of the directors may be ultra
vires, because of restrictions contained in the corporate charter or in contracts with
stockholders and creditors. See Loftus v. Mason, 240 F.2d 428 (4th Cir. 1957). "[Tlhe
modem law of dividends has been developing by contractual rather than statutory re-
strictions." W. CAREY, CORPORATIONS 1484-85 (4th ed. 1969).
20. Randall v. Bailey, 262 App. Div. 844, 23 N.Y.S.2d 173 (Sup.Ct. 1940), aff'd, 288 N.Y.
280, 43 N.E.2d 43 (1942).
21. No stock corporation shall declare or pay any dividend which shall impair its
capital or capital stock, nor while its capital or capital stock is impaired, nor
shall any such corporation declare or pay any dividend or make any distribution
of assets to any of its stockholders, whether upon a reduction of the number of
its shares or of its capital or capital stock, unless the value of its assets remaining
after the payment of such dividend, or after such distribution of assets, as the
case may be, shall be at least equal to the aggregate amount of its debts and
liabilities including capital or capital stock as the case may be.
[1923] N.Y. Laws ch. 787, § 58.
22. The new statute adds an insolvency test to the restrictions on impairment of capital.
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 510(b) (McKinney 1963). There is an added prohibition against
distributions which are "contrary to any restrictions contained in the certificate of in-
corporation." Id., § 510(c). It has been observed that the committee which drafted the
new statute intended it to recognize the Randall holding. 7 CAVITCH, BUSINESS ORGA-
NIZATIONS § 140.02[1) n.46 (1965).
23. Jennery v. Olmstead, 36 Hun 536 (N.Y. Sup.Ct. 1885).
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was not a proper source for distributions. Cox v. Leahy,2" however,
indicated that unrealized appreciation in land value was a factor to be
considered in paying dividends. This case was also significant for its
statement that "[t] he fact that the corporation has not the ready funds
sufficient to pay the dividend, and therefore borrows money with
which to pay the dividend, does not render the declaration and
payment illegal." 2 s
In 1925, the year following Cox, two apparently conflicting opinions
were delivered interpreting New York law. Hills v. International
Products Co.2 6 indicated that an increase in value of cattle, resulting
from increases in weight and numbers, was not a source of dividends
until the increase had been realized by a market transaction. On the
other hand, Justice Brandeis concluded in Edwards v. Douglas that the
surplus available for distribution was not limited to "paid-in surplus"
and "earned surplus... derived wholly from undistributed profits,"
but also included ". . .the increase in valuation of land or other assets
made upon a revaluation of the company's fixed property." 2"
Randall v. Bailey laid the issue to rest and remains the authoritative
statement of New York law to date. The decision reconciled the
apparent conflicts in the previous cases by recognizing that appreciation
did not result in "profits" out of which dividends could be paid, but
did result in a "capital surplus" from which distributions for cash
dividend purposes were permissible. The Randall court adopted the
Edwards v. Douglas conclusion that dividends out of capital surplus
were not barred by the rule prohibiting distributions out of "capital,"
since capital and capital surplus are not the same thing.2 8
Randall involved a corporation called the Bush Terminal Company.
Prior to 1915, the company carried its land on its books at actual cost
of $1,526,157. From 1915 to 1918, the land was gradually written up
on the books to its tax assessed value of $8,737,949. Although the
corporation had no retained earnings between 1928-1932, it treated the
write-up balance of $7,211,791 as capital surplus and paid dividends
from it. An action was brought by a trustee in bankruptcy against
former directors to recover the amount of dividends declared and paid
during that period, alleging that the dividends were paid out of capital.
In its consideration of whether such dividends constituted impair-
ment of capital, as prohibited by statute,2 9 the New York Supreme
Court concluded that ". . . the issue, in any case in which it is claimed
that dividends have been paid out of capital, is the value of the
24. Cox v. Leahy, 209 App. Div. 313, 204 N.Y.S. 741 (1924).
25. Id. at 315, 204 N.Y.S. at 743.
26. Hills v. International Products Co., 129 Misc. 25, 220 N.Y.S. 711, affd, 226 App. Div.
730, 233 N.Y.S. 784 (1925).
27. Edwards v. Douglas, 269 U.S. 204, 214 (1925).
28. Randall v. Bailey, 288 N.Y. 280, 291, 43 N.E.2d 43, 48 (1942).




assets . ., at the time the dividends were declared and paid." '3 0 The
court made it clear, therefore, that the test was not whether liabilities
exceeded assets, taken at cost, but rather taken at their current value.
Holding for the defendant directors, the case established that
impairment of capital occurs only when the dividends paid deplete the
assets below the sum equivalent to the total liabilities plus par or stated
value of paid-up issued shares of stock. In this case, the dividends paid
in the aggregate of $3,639,058 out of a write-up balance of $7,211,791
did not deplete the assets below the total liabilities and the stated value
of the issued stock and were, therefore, not paid out of capital.3
Probably the leading case representing a contrary view of asset
revaluation is Berks Broadcasting v. Craumer. 2 Although the case was
decided under a prior Pennsylvania statute expressly prohibiting
unrealized appreciation as a cash dividend source, it remains a good
statement of traditional legal and accounting opposition to the practice.
Relying on the rule of creditor protection, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court took a strict view of the surplus available for dividends, by
asserting that only earned surplus composed of realized earnings or
profits was a proper source of cash dividends.3 This conclusion is in
accord with the realization concept in accounting, and reflects the fear
that increases in value may never be actually realized in the event of
sale or liquidation.3 4 The court, however, observed that the prohibition
did not apply to stock dividends since they in no way could impair the
stated capital.3"
A 1949 Delaware case, Morris v. Standard Gas & Electric Co.,3 6
involved a shareholder's suit to enjoin payment of a dividend to
preferred stockholders because of an existing capital impairment.
Although there were current earnings sufficient to cover the dividend,
30. Randall v. Bailey, 23 N.Y.S.2d 173, 185 (Sup.Ct. 1940).
31. Id. at 178. In addition to its basic statement on capital, the case was significant for its
assertion that directors should not blindly accept company figures based on cost, but
rather should "exercise an informed judgment of their own" in considering both in-
creases and decreases in value of assets at each dividend declaration. The court indi-
cated that such considerations do not always require an actual write-up or write-down
on the books, but that informal appraisals were sufficient. Id. at 184-85.
32. Berks Broadcasting Co. v. Craumer, 356 Pa. 620, 52 A.2d 571 (1947).
33. "[A ] surplus must be a bona fide and not an artificial or fictitious one; it must be founded
upon actual earnings or profits and not be dependent for its existence upon a theoretical
estimate of an appreciation in the value of the company's assets." Id. at 624, 53 A.2d at
574.
34. The reason why a purely conjectural increase in valuations cannot be con-
sidered for the purpose of [cash] dividends is because such re-appraisals, how-
ever apparently justified and accurate for the time being, are subject to market
fluctuations, are merely anticipatory of future profit, and may never be actually
realized as an asset of the company.
Id.
35. "The reason for this distinction is that a stock dividend cannot affect creditors or
shareholders adversely since, unlike a cash or property dividend, it does not decrease
the company's assets." Id. at 626, 52 A.2d at 575.
36. Morris v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 31 Del. Ch. 20, 63 A.2d 577 (1949).
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the company showed a deficit on its books. The company directors
applied to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and received
permission to pay the dividend on the basis of an informal appraisal of
asset values. Their position was that the market value of securities held
for investment was more than sufficient to cover the deficit, and that
even though no actual write-up to reflect unrealized appreciation was
made, the true test of capital impairment should be based on the
market value of the assets. The Morris court agreed and favorably cited
Randall v. Bailey as authority for such a director's appraisal. 3
Critics of the practice of paying cash dividends out of unrealized
appreciation may appropriately cite the lack of case law on the subject
in recent years. 8 The answer may be that management and corporate
counsel are simply unaware of the existing possibilities under various
state laws. The more probable answer, however, is that the reluctance
of the accounting profession to overcome the cost and realization
conventions has largely influenced management decisions. As one
observer has commented, "... . whether we like it or not and whether
we are wholly aware of it or not, the accountants may be making our
law". 3 " It cannot be contested that the impact of Randall on cash
dividends out of unrealized appreciation has not started a rash of brush
fires. Nevertheless, the case's statements on unrealized appreciation as a
determining factor of whether capital has been impaired have been
favorably adopted in several recent cases, all involving stock re-purchase
contracts for the acquisition of treasury stock.
The leading case on the subject is Mountain State Steel Foundries,
Inc. v. Commissioner, IRS.4" The case originated with a tax court
ruling that a company contract for acquisition of treasury stock
constituted impairment of capital in violation of a West Virginia
statute. 4 The tax commissioner objected to an appraisal by company
directors which indicated that, on the basis of market value, assets
exceeded liabilities plus capital and hence no impairment existed. The
commissioner's objection did not dispute that unrealized appreciation
could eliminate a deficit, but rather reflected an opinion that such
appreciation must be shown by an actual writeup on the books. He
considered an appraisal which was not recorded on the books as
37. Id. at 30, 63 A.2d at 582. It is interesting to note that the rationale for increased value in
Randall was based on tax assessments, but in Morris was based on considerations of
market prices, capitalization of current dividends, and capitalization of average earn-
ings for prior years. Id. at 26, 63 A.2d at 580. The Delaware Court of Chancery appar-
ently chose to ignore dicta in an earlier Delaware case indicating a contrary conclusion.
See Kingston v. Home Life Ins. Co., 11 Del. Ch. 258, 101 A. 898 (1917), affd, 11 Del. Ch.
428, 104 A. 25 (1918).
38. "Randall v. Bailey has produced no marked change in the disfavor with which un-
realized appreciation is viewed as a source of dividends." Dean, Provision for Capital
Exhaustion Under Changing Price Levels, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1339, 1343 n. 11 (1952).
39. Baker, Hildebrand on Texas Corporations-A Review, 21 TEX. L. REV. 169, 190 (1942).
40. Mountain State Steel Foundries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d 737 (4th Cir. 1960).
41. W. VA. CODE OF 1955, § 3051.
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insufficient.4 2 A declaratory judgment in the Circuit Court for Wood
County, West Virginia, however, interpreted the statute as requiring
consideration of actual market value of assets and concluded that
appraisals satisfied the requirement.
On appeal to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge
Haynsworth agreed with the Wood County decision. He noted the
similarities of the case to the problem of dividends out of unrealized
appreciation and cited both the Randall and Morris cases as authority
on the point,4 observing that "[i] f write ups by appraisal be subject
to criticism in the world of corporate finance, a blind acceptance of
book value as real is much more vulnerable". 4 4
Mountain State received affirmative recognition in a subsequent New
York case, Baxter v. Lancer Industries,4 s which involved a Florida
statute.4 6 The facts were much the same and the issue was whether
unrealized appreciation was a proper source for re-purchase of stock in
the absence of retained earnings. The court acknowledged that the
purpose of the statute was for the protection of creditors and
shareholders4 ' and also acknowledged that the problem was similar to
the dividend issue.4 ' Baxter also asserted that the law, not accounting
statements, was determinative of the issue. 4 9 After computing the
actual asset values, the court concluded that there were insufficient
funds available, even after a conservative write-up, that would permit
the stock redemption without impairing capital.
Even more recently, Mountain State was followed in a Washington
case on stock re-purchase, which held that unrealized appreciation
could be considered to compel enforcement of a stock redemption
contract where the company had understated asset values on its
books.' 0 Although these cases are not concerned with dividends, they
indicate a judicial awareness of the Randall and Morris type of
problems and the related issue of market value as a significant factor in
deciding capital impairment cases. By implication, these courts indicate
42. 284 F.2d at 741.
43. Id. at 742 n.6.
44. Id. at 741.
45. 213 F. Supp. 92, 95 (E.D.N.Y. 1963).
46. The Florida statute empowers corporations to: "Purchase, hold, sell and transfer shares
of its own capital stock, provided that no corporation shall purchase any of its own capi-
tal stock except from the surplus of its assets over its liabilities including capital." FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 608.13(9)(b) (1953). Note: This section raises the familiar question of
whether such surplus is limited to earned surplus (retained earnings) or whether it may
include a "capital surplus" from unrealized appreciation as in Randall.
47. 213 F. Supp. at 96.
48. "The withdrawal of assets by a shareholder on sale of his share to the corporation has
the same effect upon creditors as the payment of a dividend and should thus be allowed
only when the corporation could properly declare a dividend." 213 F. Supp. at 96.
49. "The existence or non-existence of adequate surplus is not to be determined solely upon
the defendant's financial statements." 213 F. Supp. at 95.
50. "Actual values, rather than book figures are critical to the inquiry." Bishop v. Prosser-
Grandview Broadcasters, Inc., 3 Wash. App. 43, 49, 472 P.2d 560, 564 (1970).
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a favorable disposition toward unrealized appreciation as a cash
dividend source.
III. THE MODEL BUSINESS ACT AND UNREALIZED
APPRECIATION
The text of the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) provides no
help in resolving the dividend problem. Section 45(a) states that
"[d I ividends may be declared and paid in cash or property only out of
the unreserved and unrestricted earned surplus of the corporation...",
except when the corporation is insolvent, or would become insolvent
by payment of the dividend, or when payment would be contrary to
restrictions contained in the articles of incorporation. 5' On the other
hand, Section 46 permits "distributions" out of capital surplus, but
makes no mention of whether revaluation is a permissible source of
capital surplus.' 2 Capital surplus is given a broad definition elsewhere
as being ".... the entire surplus of a corporation other than its earned
surplus."' 5 Section 70, entitled Special Provisions Relating to Surplus
and Reserves, is also silent as to creation of capital surplus from
unrealized appreciation.5 "
Significant questions are raised by these sections of the MBCA. The
first, of course, is whether the act permits cash dividends out of
unrealized appreciation. The second is whether such appreciation is
properly a credit to earned surplus or to capital surplus.5 s Two former
chairmen of the American Bar Association Committee on Corporate
Law, which drafted the MBCA, provide some interesting answers. Both
Seward and Garrett maintain that the Act does permit the use of
unrealized appreciation, but disagree with the Randall v. Bailey
conclusion that the proper account to be credited is capital surplus.' 6
Seward argues that since realized gains and losses are first charged
against earned surplus, a logical inconsistency would result if unrealized
gains and losses are not treated the same way. He contends that earned
surplus is determined by "value of assets" and not by "historical
cost".
5 7
51. MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr. ANN. (SECOND) § 45(a) (1971).
52. Id. § 46.
53. Id. § 2(m).
54. Id. § 70.
55. The problem of whether a cash dividend from a revaluation is a "dividend" from earned
surplus or whether it is a "distribution" from capital surplus is more than a semantics
problem, particularly when the tax consequences are considered. As will be discussed
later, an earned surplus dividend may be taxable as a capital gain, whereas a distribu-
tion (whether called a "dividend" or not) from capital surplus may be tax-free to both
the corporation and the shareholder, if it reasonably can be termed a redistribution of
capital.
56. Seward, Earned Surplus-Its Meaning and Use in the Model Business Corporation Act,
38 VA. L. REV. 435, 440-43 (1952); Garrett, Capital Surplus Under the New Corpora-
tion Statutes, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROR 239, 259 (1958).
57. Seward, supra note 56, at 443.
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Although this position may be logically sound from an accounting
theory viewpoint, 8 it does not appear to have any support in law or in
accounting practice. As already noted, New York law recognizes the
validity of cash dividends from revaluation surplus, but specifically says
that such surplus is not earned surplus.' ' North Carolina has a similar
provision,6 and one authority has concluded that Wisconsin law, 6 '
patterned after the MBCA, permits such a distribution from capital
surplus, not out of earned surplus. 62 Despite the Seward and Garrett
opinions, the strongest argument for crediting capital surplus rather
than earned surplus is found in the Comments to Section 2 of the
MBCA, which say that "[wIhere directors revalue assets upward, the
corresponding credit is to capital surplus.
' 6
1
IV. MARYLAND CORPORATION LAW
In light of the foregoing discussion, the dividend section 6 4  and
related provisions of the Maryland corporation law permit some
interesting inferences. Although no reference is made to dividends out
of unrealized appreciation, the statute appears not only to permit it,
but to require consideration of current value of assets before a dividend
is paid. This conclusion is based on the similarity of the Maryland
statutory language to that used in jurisdictions which have allowed the
practice and by inference from the statute's legislative history.
The present Maryland dividend statute was enacted in 1951.6 5 Prior
to that year, the only reference to dividends was in a section on
Liability of Officers and Directors,6 6 which remained substantially
unchanged from 1868 until the 1951 revision of Maryland corporation
58. Accounting principles require that realized gains from sales be credited to retained
earnings. Accordingly,
[i]f the revalued asset is subsequently sold, all gains will be realized and clearly
should be part of earned surplus [retained earnings]. But if part of the gain has
already been allocated to capital surplus by revaluation, it can never be carried
as earned surplus.... Hence the unrealized appreciation should be considered
a gain in the first instance and credited to earned surplus.
Bugge, Unrealized Appreciation As a Source of Shareholder Distributions Under the
Wisconsin Business Corporation Law, 1964 Wis. L. REV. 292, 297 (1964).
59. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 102 (McKinney 1963); Louisiana law expressly states that
"revaluation to reflect unrealized appreciation in value of assets" is capital surplus.
LA. REV. STAT. § 12.1 (1969).
60. N.C. Bus. CORP. ACT § 55-49(d) (1957).
61. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.38 (1957).
62. Bugge, supra note 58, at 297.
63. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. (SECOND), § 2, 2, comments. For a thorough discussion
of the surplus issue, which interprets the MBCA in accord with the comments to § 2
and disagrees with the Seward conclusion, see Hackney, Financial Provisions of
MBCA, 70 HARv. L. REV. 1357, 1381 (1957).
64. MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 37 (1957).
65. [1951] Laws of Md. ch. 135, § 33.
66. [1868] Laws of Md. ch. 471, §§ 62-64.
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law.6  Presumably, the code revision commission was aware of the
implications of the Randall and Morris cases when it drafted the present
language.6 8 More recently, a similar commission proposed substantial
revisions of other sections in the corporation laws, which were enacted
in 1967. The dividend section, however, remains in its 1951 form.
Corporation statutes imposing restrictions on dividends generally
apply a combination of tests. The three types used include the
insolvency test, the capital impairment test, and the earned surplus test
(which restricts dividends to payments out of earnings).6" The
Maryland corporation statute employs both the insolvency and capital
impairment tests:
No dividend shall be declared or paid at a time when the
corporation is insolvent or its stated capital is impaired, or when
the payment thereof would render the corporation insolvent or
would impair its stated capital. For the purposes of this
paragraph, a corporation shall be deemed to be insolvent if its
debts exceed its assets taken at a fair valuation or if it is unable
to meet its debts as they mature in the usual course of
business.7 0
Although the capital impairment test is similar to that used in other
states, Maryland law is unique in employing two insolvency tests.
Insolvency is defined in both the bankruptcy and equity senses. Even if
it could be successfully argued that the Maryland capital impairment
test permits a different conclusion than was reached in Randall and
Morris under similar language, the insolvency tests, by statutory
definition, require consideration of a fair or current value of assets,
rather than cost. 7 The Maryland statute, by its terms and definitions,
appears to be even more liberal then the New York statute.7 2
The Maryland dividend law, by implication, appears to permit a
67. "Until 1951 there was no statute expressly providing for the declaration and pay-
ment of dividends, and the board of directors was therefore vested with full power and
discretion with respect thereto, as at common law." BRUNE, MARYLAND CORPORATION
LAW § 223 (1953). See also Reporter's Notes, REPORT OF COMMISSION ON REVISION OF
CORPORATION LAWS (Md. 1950).
68. This presumption is based on the common practice of code revision committees to
make comparative studies of statutes in other jurisdictions. Accordingly, it would seem
that New York and Delaware would present model corporation statutes for study.
69. 7 CAVITCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 140.01[1] (1965). The capital impairment test is
also called the "balance sheet or surplus test" and the earned surplus test is also
called the "income statement or profits test." Bugge, supra note 58, at 298.
70.- MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 37(a)(2) (1957). Maryland also has a source test forbidding
payment of dividends on a junior stock from capital surplus arising from issuance of
stock in excess of par or stated value of a senior stock. See note 75 infra.
71. Current valuation of the assets is the only means of determining bankruptcy in-
solvency. While equity insolvency imposes a higher standard, current valuation
would be relevant both as an indication of whether funds could be raised to meet
existing obligations, and as to whether the more serious form of insolvency has
been reached.
Bugge, supra note 58, at 297-98.
72. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 510 (McKinney, 1963).
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company, with either no retained earnings or with earnings insufficient
to pay a desired divided, to revalue its assets to reflect unrealized
appreciation, by either an actual write-up or an appraisal, and to pay a
dividend out of the surplus created. A dividend paid from a source
other than earned surplus is subject to two statutory restrictions: first,
it must not be prohibited by the corporation charter," 3 and second, a
dividend which is not paid out of earnings must have its source properly
disclosed to stockholders. 74 A third restriction is imposed on capital
surplus arising from the issuance of stock in excess of par, by
prohibiting the payment of the excess from a preferred class of stock to
common stockholders." This restriction does not apply to capital
surplus created by revaluation, however, since its source is unrealized
appreciation in asset value, rather than the issuance of a particular class
of stock.
The insolvency and impairment tests, together with the source
restrictions, suggest that capital surplus is the proper account out of
which dividends from unrealized appreciation are to be paid. Similar
statutes in Louisiana, New York 76  and North Carolina7 7 expressly
state that such distributions are not to be paid out of earned surplus.
The official Comments to the MBCA indicate a similar treatment.7 s
Since Maryland law expressly permits use of capital surplus to eliminate
a deficit created by depreciation in value of assets,7" it would be a
73. "No dividend shall be declared or paid contrary to any restrictions contained in the
charter." MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 37(a)(1) (1957).
74. "If a dividend is paid from any source other than earned surplus, the source of such
dividend shall be disclosed to the stockholders receiving such dividend, prior to or con-
currently with payment thereof...." MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 37(a)(3) (1957).
The section on application of capital surplus contains the provision: "The applica-
tion of capital surplus to such purposes [referring to other provisions in the section]
shall be disclosed to the stockholders of the corporation in the first annual report of the
corporation thereafter." MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 25 (1957).
It is not clear what form such disclosure must take. Must it appear on the balance
sheet or is a mere note to stockholders sufficient? In New York the disclosure require-
ment is satisfied by a formal notice accompanying the dividend check. See 8 WEST'S
McKINNEY'S FORMS, BCL § 6:17 (1965).
75. "[Blut no capital surplus paid in with respect to any class of stock may be used for
the payment of dividends on any class of stock junior thereto." MD. ANN. CODE art. 23,
§ 37(a)(3) (1957).
76. By statutory definition, capital surplus includes "[slurplus arising from revaluation to
reflect unrealized appreciation in value of assets." LA. REV. STAT. § 12: l(E) (1969).
"Unrealized appreciation of assets is not included in earned surplus." N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAW § 102(a)(6) (McKinney 1963).
77. N.C. Bus. CORP. ACT § 55-49(d) (1957). The North Carolina statute apparently modified
that state's case law on the subject. The statute appears to follow an early case that
cash dividends may be paid from unrealized appreciation, but modifies the case's hold-
ing that the dividends were out of earnings. See Cannon v. Wiscasset Mills Co., 195
N.C. 119, 141 S.E. 348 (1928).
78. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT. ANN. (SECOND) § 2, comments (1971).
79. Any corporation may, by resolution of its board of directors, apply any part or
all of its capital surplus (i) to the reduction or elimination of any deficit arising
from operating or other losses, however incurred, or from diminution in the value
of its assets, but only after applying or exhausting the earned surplus, if any, or
(ii) for other corporate purposes.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 25 (1957).
Baltimore Law Review
logical inconsistency not to credit the same account for appreciation in
value.8 0
V. WATCHFUL EYE OF THE SEC
Any corporation considering paying a dividend out of unrealized
appreciation today will probably consider its validity in the eyes of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) as being equally as important as the state law. The rules
and regulations of the SEC generally reflect acceptance of current
accounting principles and therefore are a potential source of conflict
with practices otherwise permissible under state law. The SEC has
indicated in various releases and hearings that it will carefully observe
the treatment of such actions in corporate financial statements.
Revaluation of assets involving an actual write-up on the books must
be reported to the SEC 8 ' and shown in the capital surplus account on
the balance sheet as "surplus arising from revaluation of assets." 8 2 The
main concern of the SEC is a full and fair disclosure of the methods
used to arrive at a value other than cost. It rejected an appraisal of a
hydroelectric plant where the ". . . engineer failed to follow any
accepted appraisal techniques,"' 3 and has also disapproved arbitrary
figures determined "without any basis in sound valuation."' Factors
to be considered in revaluation or appraisal (of which the SEC indicates
approval) include record of earning capacity,8 ' use of scientific
methods of appraisal and a fair and accurate application of the
methods purported to be followed.8 6 The Commission has also
indicated that tax assessed value (which was the basis for the write-up
in Randall v. Bailey) and the local real estate market are factors which
may be properly considered.8  Anticipation of profits in a new
company with no record or prior earnings, however, is not acceptable 8
and compliance with requirements of state law is not determinative of
appraisal validity under the Securities Acts.8 9
80. The Building and Homestead Associations provisions contain an exception to this,
which says that such companies may not pay dividends out of unearned surplus. MD.
ANN. CODE art. 23, § 161 FF (1957).
81. SEC, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 4991 (Jan. 28, 1954). It is unclear whether
an appraisal, as opposed to an actual write-up, on which dividends are based should
also be reported. Any company considering the action would be well-advised to do so,
however, thereby avoiding any charge of failure to report.
82. W. CASEY, ACCOUNTING DESK BOOK 351 (1969). Mr. Casey is the Chairman of the SEC.
He considers this to be a requirement of Art. 5 of SEC Reg. S-X. See generally SEC
Reg. S-X; 17 C.F.R. § 210 (1972).
83. Fall River Power Co., 38 S.E.C. 423 (1958).
84. In re Consol. Mines Syndicate, 2 S.E.C. 316 (1937).
85. SEC, Accounting Series Release No. 8, May 20, 1938; 11 Fed. Reg. 10,915 (1938).
86. Breeze Corp., 3 S.E.C. 717 (1938); Winnebago Distilling Co., 6 S.E.C. 926 (1940).
87. Continental Distillers & Importers Corp., 1 S.E.C. 54 (1935).
88. SEC, supra note 85.
89. In re Brandy-Wine Brewing Co., 1 S.E.C. 123 (1935).
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VI. TAX CONSEQUENCES OF REVALUATION
Whether payments resulting from unrealized appreciation are
properly termed dividends or distributions becomes an important
question when tax consequences are considered. While this may present
only a semantics problem in financial accounting and corporation law,
it is of primary importance in accounting for tax purposes. Certainly
one of the most attractive features of unrealized appreciation is the
possible tax shelter for a corporation. Arguably, if such a payment is
made out of a capital surplus account, from the tax viewpoint it may be
considered a return of capital to the investor, and as such, be a tax-free
distribution to the extent that it exceeds earnings, both to the
corporation and to the stockholder.9 0
The Internal Revenue Service will make its own determination of
whether the payment is a dividend or a distribution, regardless of what
the corporation calls it.9 ' A survey of tax cases indicates a general
agreement that unrealized appreciation does not increase earnings or
profits and therefore such payments are not taxable as ordinary
income.9 2 Whether they are taxable as capital gains, however, remains
controversial. The general rule is that the capital gains and losses
provisions of the Internal Revenus Code apply only where there has
been a sale or exchange resulting in a realized gain or loss.9
Revaluation for dividend purposes may be an exception to this rule,
however.
In C.I.R. v Gross,9 4 a case involving real estate holdings in Baltimore
County, Maryland and in New York, a building corporation revalued
the real estate by a write up on its books. The cash payment which was
made to stockholders out of the resulting surplus was termed taxable as
ordinary income by the tax commissioner. On appeal, however, the
distribution was determined to be taxable to the stockholder as a
capital gain only. A more recent case in the District of Columbia9 " held
that since unrealized appreciation is not earned, any resulting dividend
or distribution is not taxable as ordinary income. Although the court
did not expressly state that a capital gain resulted, it did cite favorably
the Gross case.
9 6
90. Randall v. Bailey, 288 N.Y. 280, 290, 43 N.E.2d 43, 48 (1942).
91. General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935).
92. Id.: C.I.R. v. Gross, 236 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1956); C.I.R. v. Hirshon Trust, 213 F.2d 523
(2d Cir. 1954); C.I.R. v. Godley's Estate, 213 F.2d 529 (3d Cir. 1954); District of Colum-
bia v. Oppenheimer, 301 F.2d 563 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
93. 3B MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 22.91 (1966).
94. C.I.R. v. Gross, 236 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1956).
95. District of Columbia v. Oppenheimer, 301 F.2d 563 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
96. A collateral issue worth considering is the payment of dividends in kind from unrealized
appreciation.
[W]here the corporation distributes the property itself in kind, the traditional
view has been that not only does the corporation escape a tax on the apprecia-
tion but, in the absence of sufficient other earnings and profits, the stockholder
too may escape tax; the property distributed takes a new basis in his hands
equal to its then value, so that he may sell it without incurring taxable gain.
Dividends In Kind-The Thunderbolts and the New Look, 10 TAX LAW REv. 44 (1954).
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Recent developments in tax law, including the Revenue Act of 1964
and the Tax Reform Act of 1969 indicate that these cases probably are
still good law. Primarily because of tax benefits resulting from
accelerated depreciation, an increased tax liability will arise once the
asset is actually disposed of by sale.' ' Nevertheless, it appears that
distributions from unrealized appreciation, in assets held for income
and not for sale, can result in nothing more than a capital gain.
VII. WHY REVALUE?
In spite of the previously minor impact of Randall v. Bailey on the
law of dividends in jurisdictions other than New York, the case remains
a potential landmark for corporations in many states, including
Maryland. Even though state law may permit dividends or distributions
out of unrealized appreciation, the actual decision to make such
payments belongs to corporation directors even though corporate
counsel may be satisfied as to the legality of the practice. As one
observer puts it:
The fact that legal surplus and book surplus as shown on the
financial statements may not be the same, is ordinarily not of
much significance because directors usually decide as a matter
of business policy to confine dividends to a portion of the
earnings of the corporation as shown in the financial
statements. 8
Once the legality of such payments is determined, however,
distributions out of unrealized appreciation have several features which
should be attractive to directors in a period of little or no earnings.
They provide reassurance to stockholders and potential investors during
a period of slow growth, which the directors anticipate as temporary,
by permitting a "consistent dividend record" and preventing "arrear-
ages in cumulative preferred dividends." 9" They may satisfy preferred
stockholders who made investments in anticipation of a yearly return.
Likewise, they may be used to prevent take-over bids by preferred
stockholders.' 00 The possible creation of a tax shelter is certainly not
Case law on the subject is full of conflicting decisions. However, the opinions vari-
ously hold that such payments are tax-free, taxable as capital gains, and taxable as
ordinary income. For a general survey of the problem see 3B MERTENS, supra note 93,
§ 9.50.
97. See FIFLIS & KRIPKE at 63; Ferrari, 1964 Act: Real Property Hit by Depreciation Recap-
ture, 20 J. TAXATION 308 (1964); CORPORATE COUNSEL'S ANNUAL 997 (1970).
98. G. SEWARD, BASIC CORPORATE PRACTICE 89 (1966).
99. Bugge, supra note 58, at 292.
100. Apparently the fear of take-over fights among stockholders was an important incentive
for many of the Australian companies' distributions out of revaluation surplus. See
R. CHAMBERS, supra note 17, at 172.
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the least attractive feature. A distribution with no ordinary income tax
to stockholders should provide as great an incentive to directors as the
possibility of a distribution which is tax-free to both the corporation
and the stockholder.' 01
In addition to the accountants' objection that such distributions are
contrary to generally accepted accounting principles,' 02 several other
arguments have been offered opposing the practice. Critics object that a
revalued fixed asset may lose its unrealized gain before it is sold,
particularly if the dividend is followed by a period of declining
prices.' 03 It has also been proposed that such dividends are
"misleading to stockholders and investors as to the extent of corporate
prosperity" and that they "may well lead to an impairment of creditor
security."' 04
Arguments favoring the use of unrealized appreciation attack the
accounting use of historical cost as not providing "objective measure-
ment" of asset value at any time other than acquisition.' The
accountant's objection to use of revaluation figures has been criticized
as being simply a mathematical problem which can be eliminated by
formulas distinguishing true appreciation from mere changes in the
dollar value.' 06 One interesting argument asserts that the practice can
actually be permitted by present accounting principles by taking
depreciation on the revalued figures which will eventually be charged
against future earnings.' 07
Opponents' concern that unrealized gain may be lost before the asset
is sold ignores the requirement expressed in Randall v: Bailey that
directors must consider any unrealized depreciation in value before
declaring a dividend.' 08 The strongest argument for revaluation,
however, is that stockholders and future investors will not be misled,
but will be better informed by gradual allocation of gains to each
income period. To show only realized gains on assets gives a false
impression of a corporation's earnings capacity in the current period,
when in reality, the gain was a gradual increase over past periods.' 09
101. See G. SEWARD, supra note 98, at 91-92.
102. APB No. 6, supra note 14.
103. Berks Broadcasting v. Craumer, 356 Pa. 620, 52 A.2d 571 (1947); 28 U. CIN. L. REV.,
supra note 13, at 82.
104. 28 U. CIN. L. REV., supra note 13, at 85.
105. American Accounting Association, The Matching Concept, 40 AccTG. REV. 368, 370
(1965).
106. FiFLis & KRIPKE at 324.
107. "If a revalued asset is depreciated at its new value, there is no need for a sale to
realize the gain, for it will be incrementally realized out of earnings and accumulated in
the depreciation reserve account." Bugge, supra note 58, at 304; see also Fitts, The
Relation of Depreciation to the Determination of Surplus and Earnings Available for
Dividends, 33 VA. L. REV. 581 (1947).
Note: Although this procedure is no longer sanctioned by the AICPA (APB No. 6, supra
note 14), in theory it still conforms to general accounting principles.
108. 23 N.Y.S. 2d at 178.
109. Fus & KRIPKE at 308; R. CHAMBERS, supra note 17, at 336.
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The whole controversy of revaluation and dividends raises an
interesting question: why should a corporation be prohibited from
revaluing upwards fixed assets for dividend purposes, when it may
revalue them at other times? In a quasi-reorganization, directors may
write down fixed assets even without a court mandate.' I1 Maryland
law permits use of capital surplus to wipe out a deficit caused by
depreciation in value of assets,' I I so why not credit capital surplus for
appreciation in value? It is objectionable for a going concern to revalue,
yet in bankruptcy proceedings a corporation is required to write up or
write down both fixed and current assets to realizable market value.' I 2
Revaluation of current assets is also permissible. Securities held for
investment purposes may be revalued to reflect appreciation and may
apparently be a source of dividends in some states.' ' ' Optional
methods of valuing inventories are commonly permitted through the
use of the FIFO and LIFO "fictions" which represent departures from
historical cost.' I' Whether fixed assets are reasonably subject to
different treatment for dividend purposes could well have been a
question disturbing the courts in Randall v. Bailey.
CONCLUSION
Cash dividends to stockholders are generally paid on the basis of
either current or retained earnings or a combination of both. This
practice conforms to the traditional rule of corporation law that
dividends must be paid out of profits and not out of capital, based on
the historical concern for protecting creditors. Restricting dividends to
realized earnings also complies with generally accepted accounting
principles which require a sale or market transaction before a gain in
value of assets is available for stockholder distribution.
An interesting conflict between corporation law and accounting
principles develops, however, in states where dividend statutes permit
distributions from sources other than realized earnings. Such statutes
are implemented by restrictive tests which determine the validity of
stockholder distributions by requiring director determination of
insolvency and capital impairment. By definition, such tests require
consideration of asset value despite their book value and, although
110. FIFLIS & KRIPKE, at 400-06.
111. MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 25 (1957).
112. Central States Elec. Corp. v. Austrian, 183 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1950); cert. denied, 340
U.S. 917 (1950); In re Reb Holding Co., 35 F. Supp. 716 (D.C. Wis. 1940).
113. Bugge, supra note 58, at 303 n. 58, referring to the prior practice of DuPont to annually
write-up its holdings of General Motors stock; see also MOONITZ, THE BASIC POSTU-
LATES OF ACCOUNTING 30 (1961).
114. Hackney, supra note 63, at 1380. For a discussion of the optional methods of valuing
inventories, see W. MEIGS & C. JOHNSON, ACCOUNTING: THE BASIS FOR BUSINESS DE-
CISIONS 334-55 (2d ed. 1967).
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accounting terms are used throughout dividend statutes, the conflict
must be resolved by legal interpretation and not by accounting
standards.
In marked contrast to recommendations of the accounting profes-
sion, New York law has been interpreted as requiring director
consideration of market value of assets at each dividend declaration.
Randall v. Bailey held that a going concern, with no prospects of either
liquidation or sale of its assets, could revalue its fixed assets to reflect
fair value, either by an actual write-up on its books or by informal
appraisal, despite the lack of retained earnings and the existence of a
deficit. The unrealized appreciation in value was to be credited to a
capital surplus account and could provide a basis for cash dividends or
distributions to stockholders.
Several states have expressly rejected the New York position in
recent statutes. Aside from a few recent cases involving treasury stock
acquisitions, which accepted Randall v. Bailey for its statements on
consideration of fair value, the subject has produced little case law. In
Maryland, the issue has apparently never been considered by the Court
of Appeals. Applying the few cases which have been decided in other
states to Maryland statutes, however, indicates that Maryland's position
is probably more liberal than New York's.
It appears that a Maryland corporation may make a cash distribution
to stockholders from unrealized appreciation if, after a fair valuation of
assets, neither insolvency nor impairment of capital exist and proper
disclosure is made to all stockholders. Notice of intent to do so should
be sent to the SEC with disclosure of the basis for revaluation, such as
tax-assessments and past earnings record. Although the possibility of a
tax-free distribution exists, it might be advisable to treat both the
payment and the unrealized appreciation itself as capital gains in order
to avoid protracted tax hearings.
KHM
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